Philosophical Foundations of Eminent Hong Kong Chinese CEOs’ Leadership

Because of the importance of Confucian doctrines in shaping ethical business practices under Chinese leadership, revealing the roles of other Chinese ethical doctrines in modern Chinese leadership is informative. A thorough understanding of the ethical foundations of Chinese leadership is necessary for fruitful interaction with Chinese leaders, according to cultural fit theory. The present study illustrates the philosophical foundations of business management, based on dialogues with five eminent corporate executive officers (CEOs). It reveals that the CEOs practice a style of Chinese leadership synthesizing Confucian, Daoist, Mohist, and Legalist doctrines. The Confucian doctrines advocate benevolence, harmony, learning, loyalty, righteousness, and humility. They are the most prevalent tenets that support paternalism and collectivism. The Daoist doctrines emphasize flexibility and reversion (e.g., the principle that the weak can defeat the strong). They bolster the leader’s forbearance. The Mohist doctrines underpin thrift and working with the masses whereas the Legalist doctrines inculcate self-control and innovativeness. Hence, contemporary Chinese leadership does not rely exclusively on Confucian ethics and this reflects evolution over 1000s of years.     

Airline networks as joint goods: Implications for competition policy

This article derives a model of airline services as joint goods. Using this model, the article shows how the existence of higher fares in certain hub routes may imply the market has generated a solution to the problem of covering joint costs by having a larger proportion of those costs come from hub routes, rather than the existence of any general market failure. The model is then used to make recommendations for competition policy.     

Adjustment, Stabilisation and the Analysis of the Employment Structure in Turkey: An Input- Output Approach

The aim of the paper is to examine the effects on employment of the large-scale structural adjustment programme undertaken by Turkey from the early 1980s onwards. In this respect, we particularly analyse how appropriate the choices of factor intensity after structural adjustment programme have been in the domestic production in comparison with the availability of domestic factor endowment. Our findings show that foreign trade in intermediate goods creates extra use of domestic labour, which can be considered as the labour cost of importing intermediate goods. This is the case in the majority of industries in the pre- and post-liberalisation period in Turkey. However, the capacity of using extra labour as a result of importing intermediate goods appeared to have decreased in the post-liberalisation period.     

Job satisfaction and gender: Why are women so happy at work?

By most objective standards, women's jobs are worse than men's, yet women report higher levels of job satisfaction than do men. This paper uses a recent large-scale British survey to document the extent of this gender differential for eight measures of job satisfaction and to evaluate the proposition that identical men and women in identical jobs should be equally satisfied. Neither the different jobs that men and women do, their different work values, nor sample selection account for the gender satisfaction differential. The paper's proposed explanation appeals to the notion of relative well-being, especially relative to workers' expectations. An identical man and woman with the same jobs and expectations would indeed report identical job satisfaction, but women's expectations are argued to be lower than men's. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that the gender satisfaction differential disappears for the young, the higher-educated, professionals and those in male-dominated workplaces, for all of whom there is less likely to be a gender difference in job expectations.     

Ambiguity in election games

We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal. We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election. In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium. We would like to thank Alberto Alesina, Antonio Cabrales, Steve Coate, Olivier Compte, Tim Feddersen, Itzhak Gilboa, Joe Harrington, Michel Le Breton, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Steve Matthews, Steve Morris, Ignacio Ortuno, Tom Palfrey, Larry Samuelson, Murat Sertel, Fernando Vega, Eyal Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT-PB 95-0983. This work was done while the first author was visiting the Center in Political Economy at Washington University, and visiting the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard University. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The support of the second author's research by the National Science Foundation is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Instrumental values

This paper studies identification of partial differences of nonseparable structural functions. A model is defined which admits structural functions exhibiting a degree of monotonicity with respect to a latent variate. The model identifies partial differences when there are instrumental values of covariates over which the latent variate exhibits a local quantile invariance, and a local order condition holds. The result is useful when covariates exhibit discrete variation, as arises often in practice, and when restricting latent variates and covariates to be statistically independent is unpalatable. The results are illustrated with data from the returns-to-schooling study of Angrist and Krueger [1991. Does compulsory schooling attendance affect schooling and earnings? Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 979–1014].     

The Development of Corporate Charitable Contributions in the UK: A Stakeholder Analysis

This paper investigates the determinants of corporate charitable donations within a comparative study of corporate behaviour in two time periods, 1989–90 and 1998–99. The analysis is based on a longitudinal data set that includes over 400 UK listed companies. The determinants of corporate charitable donations are explored within a stakeholder model and the relationship between corporate charitable donations and a set of firm and industry variables is estimated using OLS. Particular emphasis is placed on industry effects and the impact of social and environmental stakeholders. The results highlight a significant change in behaviour between 1989–90 and 1998–99 that may reflect a strategic response by corporate decision‐makers to external concerns over corporate social responsibility. In the early period corporate charitable donations were substantially determined by profits. However, this relationship has weakened during the 1990s as firms have become increasingly responsive to stakeholder influences. The results for the later period emphasize the increasing importance of corporate visibility, and the development of social and environmental influences on corporate charitable contributions.     

Using a customer-Level marketing strategy to enhance firm performance: A review of theoretical and empirical evidence

It is becoming increasingly apparent from the literature that marketers need to consider customer-level information when they generate a marketing strategy for the firm. In this article, the authors develop a customer-focused framework that uses a marketing strategy with an overall objective of maximized financial performance. This strategy is driven by seven customer-level marketing tactics and shows how actual customer data can be used to generate an actionable marketing strategy leading to optimal levels of profitability, customer equity, and shareholder value. In addition, the authors discuss a successful implementation of this strategy for several business-to-business and business-to-consumer firms and offer insights as to how to customize an implementation strategy for any firm, along with presenting potential challenges a firm may encounter during the implementation process. Several suggestions for future research are offered to explore and harness this newly available evidence. V. Kumar (VK) (vk@business.uconn.edu) is the ING Chair Professor of Marketing and the executive director of the ING Center for Financial Services at the University of Connecticut. He spends his time by transferring his knowledge (however little it may be) to his two daughters about customer lifetime value, diffusion models, forecasting sales and market share, retailing, and marketing strategy. J. Andrew Petersen (apetersen@business.uconn.edu) is a doctoral candidate in marketing at the University of Connecticut. His research interests include customer lifetime value, word-of-mouth effects, and customer-level marketing strategy. His research has been published inMarketing Research Magazine and theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science.     

Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton—DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB.